

Misread “Dialogue”: Legal Violence and Female Silencing in The Corporal Hitler’s Pistol—With Reference to Institutional Complicity under Australian Patriarchy in the 1930s



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Abstract: Thomas Keneally’s novel *The Corporal Hitler’s Pistol* interweaves the lives of various characters in Kempsey, New South Wales, Australia, on the eve of the Second World War through the circulation of a Luger pistol. This article seeks to move beyond the traditional lens of economic determinism by incorporating Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of the “linguistic market” and “symbolic violence,” alongside Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power and discourse over the body. It focuses on the narrative episode in which the female protagonist, Flo Honeywood, unsuccessfully attempts to obtain a divorce. Through an etymological excavation and close textual reading of the key legal term “criminal conversation,” the article reveals how the Australian legal system in 1933 deprived women of discursive agency by means of obscure terminological barriers and asymmetrical dialogic mechanisms. Furthermore, by introducing Anna Weber as a mirror figure for comparative analysis, and by incorporating an intersectional perspective on Indigenous relations, the study explores the fragmentation of female identity under the dual structures of patriarchy and colonialism. The study argues that the legal system depicted in the novel is not an embodiment of justice but rather a “complicit agent” in maintaining male honor and property order within a patriarchal society. Within this framework, women are subjected to a dual form of violence: physical violence within the domestic sphere and symbolic violence within the public legal domain. The law’s prioritization of “honor” over women’s “survival” ultimately facilitates the systematic disciplining and erasure of female subjectivity at the institutional level.

Keywords: *The Corporal Hitler’s Pistol*, symbolic violence, discipline and the body, criminal conversation, 1930s Australia

1. Introduction

1.1 Research background and rationale

As one of the most distinguished contemporary Australian writers, Thomas Keneally is renowned for his profound historical consciousness and expansive narrative scope. In *The Corporal Hitler’s Pistol*, Keneally turns his attention to Kempsey, New South Wales, in 1933—a historically charged moment. The memory of the World War I had not yet faded, while the shadow of the Great Depression loomed over every household. Meanwhile, in distant Europe, Adolf Hitler’s rise to power signaled the approach of another impending catastrophe. Against this backdrop of intersecting historical tensions, the novel constructs a male-dominated world of violence: Bert Weber’s psychological breakdown, the political vengeance associated with the Irish Republican Army, and the Luger pistol as a symbol of killing and power

collectively form the novel’s explicit narrative layer.

Within the interstices of this male-authored “grand history,” female experiences emerge in a suffocating silence. Whether it is Anna Weber, tormented by her husband’s madness, or Flo Honeywood, who struggles to find a way out of a fractured marriage, their voices are consistently drowned out by the clamor of war and masculine aggression. Flo, in particular, occupies a pivotal role: she is not only a victim of domestic violence but also an agent attempting to resist her fate through legal means. Her brief yet crucial interaction with a lawyer regarding divorce cuts directly to the core tensions of gender politics in that era. This episode is far from incidental; rather, it serves as a critical entry point for Keneally’s broader critique of social institutions. Re-examining Flo’s legal predicament thus enables a deeper excavation of the novel’s subtext and provides a literary-sociological case study for understanding the lived realities of women within the legal and

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social structures of 1930s Australia.

1.2 Literature review and research innovation

As a relatively recent work, *The Corporal Hitler's Pistol* has not yet generated a substantial body of systematic scholarly monographs. Existing criticism is largely confined to in-depth reviews in mainstream literary outlets and tends to fall into two dominant interpretive paradigms.

The first is the perspective of “genre narrative and entertainment value.” Susan Wyndham, writing for *The Guardian*, characterizes the novel as a “rollicking historical crime thriller” (Wyndham, 2021). Her analysis praises Keneally’s cinematic scene construction and skillful management of suspense, yet remains focused primarily on the text’s entertainment value and readability. Consequently, this approach tends to classify the work within the conventions of genre fiction, overlooking its deeper dimensions of social critique.

The second is the perspective of “historical melodrama and functionalism.” In his review for *The Age*, James Ley argues that Keneally’s fiction broadly exhibits characteristics of melodrama, intertwining war trauma, historical memory, and emotional entanglements in small-town life into a composite narrative structure that blends grand historical themes with “soap opera”-like plotting (Ley, 2021). Within this framework, the novel employs multi-stranded narration to connect historical events such as the World War I and the Irish Civil War with the everyday life of Australian local society, illustrating how historical violence reverberates across individual lives and marginal spaces. From this perspective, the central image of the Luger pistol may be interpreted as a “MacGuffin,” a narrative device that propels character actions and links disparate temporalities and relationships. It should be noted, however, that this functionalist reading is not explicitly proposed by Ley but rather constitutes an extension of his analysis of the novel’s melodramatic structure and narrative organization.

Despite their insights, these approaches share a significant blind spot: the relative neglect of discursive violence embedded within the legal system itself. In particular, the archaic legal term “criminal conversation,” employed by the lawyer Carterford in the novel, is often dismissed in existing commentary as a humorous misunderstanding. Few scholars have examined the term through the lenses of jurisprudential archaeology or the sociology of language, thereby overlooking the underlying logic of objectification it encodes.

In response, this article seeks to fill this gap by proposing a new analytical entry point: Flo’s tragedy is not merely a consequence of economic deprivation but also a product of linguistic deprivation. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence, the study argues that the legal system, through its monopoly over “legitimate language,” deprives women of the capacity to define their own suffering. This perspective moves beyond reductive moral or economic judgments—such as whether men are “bad” or women are “poor”—and instead targets the invisible institutional machinery that enacts domination through obscure and exclusionary terminology.

1.3 Theoretical framework: Bourdieu and Foucault

To provide a nuanced analysis of the discursive mechanisms of power in the novel, this study primarily draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence, in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s conceptualizations of power, discipline, and the body. Bourdieu argues that power does not always operate through direct coercion or overt forms of domination; rather, it often permeates everyday linguistic practices under the guise of “legitimacy,” thereby rendering relations of domination naturalized and tacitly accepted.

Within Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, linguistic exchange constitutes a structured “market” in which individuals occupying different social positions possess unequal discursive resources. Those who command “legitimate language” are able to occupy a dominant position in interactions, thereby exercising greater control over the production and interpretation of meaning. Crucially, this inequality does not rely solely on external coercion; instead, it is continuously reinforced through social norms and habitual practices, acquiring an appearance of naturalness and legitimacy.

From a complementary perspective, Foucault elucidates the diffuse and decentralized nature of power. In his view, power is not concentrated in a single субъект but is dispersed across institutions, discourses, and regimes of knowledge, exerting a sustained influence on individuals through processes of discipline and normalization. In this sense, individuals are not merely passive recipients of power but also, often unwittingly, participants in its operation.

Taken together, these theoretical perspectives suggest that discursive power in the novel does not

originate from a single source but emerges through the intersection of linguistic practices and institutional norms. For women in subordinate positions, this dynamic is particularly consequential: through prolonged processes of socialization, they may internalize these unequal structures, coming to perceive them as “natural” or “inevitable,” and thereby unconsciously participate in the reproduction of power relations.

2. Historical Context and the Construction of the Legal Field

2.1 The dual shadow of 1933: the great depression and the persistence of the old order

To understand Flo’s predicament, it must be situated within the specific historical context of Australia in 1933—a period marked by rupture and contradiction. On the one hand, the dawn of modernity had begun to emerge: urbanization was accelerating, and women had already secured suffrage for several decades. On the other hand, Victorian moral residues and patriarchal family ideologies remained deeply entrenched, particularly in rural areas. The impact of the Great Depression placed immense strain on already fragile family structures. As the prominent Australian historian Stuart Macintyre has argued, the survival anxieties generated by the Depression often reinforced reliance on traditional social orders, thereby intensifying broader conservative tendencies. Unemployment rates as high as 30 percent not only devastated the economic foundations of countless households but also precipitated a crisis of masculine identity (Macintyre, 2016).

In the novel, the irritability, alcoholism, and instability of male characters can be interpreted, in part, as projections of anxiety stemming from their inability to fulfill the role of “breadwinner.” Yet rather than fostering empathy toward women, this anxiety amplifies male desires for control. Within the prevailing social ethos, maintaining family integrity was perceived as the final safeguard of social stability during times of upheaval. Consequently, any attempt to disrupt familial structures—such as a wife’s pursuit of divorce—was framed as a threat to the social order. Within this collective unconscious, women functioned not merely as individual spouses but as sacrificial agents or binding forces for societal cohesion. Flo, therefore, confronts not only an unfaithful husband but an increasingly conservative and defensive social community shaped by economic precarity.

2.2 The closure of the legal field: the judicial system as a “male club”

Although New South Wales in the 1930s underwent certain legislative modernizations, its judicial practices remained deeply rooted in the traditions of Common Law, particularly in relation to the legal status of married women. The doctrine of coverture—whereby a married woman’s legal identity was subsumed under that of her husband—had not been fully dismantled. Under this principle, husband and wife were regarded as a single legal entity, embodied in the husband.

Despite the enactment of Married Women’s Property legislation, divorce law continued to favor male interests. In the novel, the lawyer Carterford serves as a highly representative figure: he is not only a monopolizer of legal knowledge but also a custodian of patriarchal logic. As Pierre Bourdieu observes, legal discourse does not merely describe social reality; it constitutes a “creative” linguistic practice capable of establishing particular social realities as valid through its very articulation (Bourdieu, 1991). In this sense, legal language does not simply codify rules; it actively produces socially recognized realities, thereby rendering specific orders seemingly unquestionable and legitimate.

3. The Dual Modulations of Violence: Linguistic Symbolism and Bodily Discipline

3.1 The tyranny of terminology: a legal archaeology of “criminal conversation”

To fully grasp the despair Flo experiences in the lawyer’s office, it is necessary to undertake a legal archaeology of the key term “criminal conversation” invoked by Carterford. Within the tradition of Common Law, this term does not denote a modern ground for divorce but rather a form of Tort. Its underlying logic is rooted in feudal property relations, wherein a wife was regarded as a form of chattel or quasi-servant. When a third party engaged in sexual relations with a wife, the law did not concern itself with emotional betrayal; instead, it construed the act as damage to the husband’s property or as an unlawful infringement upon his right to “consortium” (i.e., services and companionship).

Significantly, although the novel is set in New South Wales in 1933, where Section 92 of the 1899 Divorce Act had nominally abolished the formal designation of “criminal conversation,” Section 52 retained its compensatory logic, allowing husbands to claim damages from adulterers. Carterford’s deliberate invocation of this archaic, feudal

term—rather than employing more modern and neutral expressions such as “adultery” or “dissolution”—is far from incidental. It constitutes a strategic linguistic archaism: by mobilizing an obsolete term laden with the connotation of “criminality,” he reactivates the spectral presence of patriarchal authority at the level of discourse. The term itself functions as a micro-display of power, reminding all present that, within the unconscious of the law, women remain objects subject to valuation and compensation.

3.2 A hermeneutics of misreading: from “conversation” to “transaction”

Flo’s misinterpretation of “criminal conversation” as “a guilty conversation” appears, on the surface, almost comical; yet from the sociological perspective of Pierre Bourdieu, it constitutes one of the novel’s most profound metaphorical ruptures.

“Adultery,” she said firmly, ‘because of adultery.’

‘Ah,’ said Mr. Carterford, as if stabbed, ‘criminal conversation.’ ...

‘I do not consider our conversation to be criminal.’” (Keneally, 2026)

This exchange dramatizes a collision between two distinct discursive systems. Flo operates within ordinary language, grounded in human relations—she assumes that interpersonal communication should not be criminalized. The lawyer, however, operates within legitimate language, grounded in objectification. As Bourdieu argues, the core mechanism of symbolic violence lies in complicity: deprived of alternative vocabularies, victims are compelled to adopt the dominant language to articulate their own experiences, thereby misrecognizing and implicitly validating the logic of domination. Carterford’s correction is not merely grammatical; it is an assertion of power. He compels Flo to accept that her suffering holds no legal meaning unless it can be translated into the language of male property loss.

3.3 Panopticism and the politics of the body: the case of “Face Powder”

If the lawyer’s office constitutes a site of symbolic violence in the public sphere, the domestic space functions as a Foucauldian panopticon. Here, Burley Honeywood is not merely a husband but an agent of surveillance and discipline. The episode involving face powder exemplifies this micro-politics of the body.

Flo’s request to be made up represents an attempt to reconstruct her bodily identity, to escape

the functional role of “mother” and “housewife.” Yet this attempt is violently suppressed by Burley, whose act of wiping away her makeup becomes a ritual of discipline.

“He dragged her into the tiled bathroom... pressing a rough cloth against her face... she thought he wanted to erase her memory, to remove the sharpness Chik had given her.” (Keneally, 2026)

Burley’s implement—a coarse washcloth—here becomes alienated into an instrument of punishment. His act of wiping away Flo’s makeup closely aligns with Michel Foucault’s formulation of the “docile body” in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1999): power no longer manifests primarily through the destruction of the body, but through the minute regulation of bodily details so as to produce subjects who conform to normative expectations. By forcibly removing her makeup, Burley reduces Flo to a compliant and unadorned “respectable woman.” This form of latent, body-directed violence is further materialized in the novel through specific symbolic imagery. The juxtaposition of the “pistol” and the “towel” renders more visible the ways in which violence permeates the very texture of everyday life.

3.4 The semiotics of objects: the binary opposition of pistol and towel

The novel’s title object—the Luger pistol—carries profound symbolic weight, representing war, penetrative violence, masculine authorship of history, and sovereign power over life and death. Male characters organize their actions around this object, whose explosive sound disrupts the fabric of everyday life.

In stark contrapuntal relation to the clamorous pistol is the washcloth that appears in Flo’s bathroom—an easily overlooked, feminized object. If the pistol belongs to the battlefield and the public square, the towel belongs to the bathroom and the domestic sphere. Burley’s act of wiping away Flo’s makeup with the towel, though devoid of gunfire, carries an equivalent destructive force. Upon closer examination, when the “washcloth” is placed in a semiotic opposition to the novel’s central image—the Luger pistol—we may discern a more concealed “economy of violence.” As a relic of war, the Luger pistol signifies overt, noisy, and penetrative forms of masculine violence; within the narrative, it is often accompanied by explosive sound and a palpable sense of historical presence, even acquiring a certain tragic sublimity. By contrast, the coarse washcloth is silent, mundane, and seemingly trivial. Yet it is precisely this “banality of evil” that proves more

devastating. Burley does not need to pull a trigger; by merely wielding the towel, he is able to carry out the “social execution” of female subjectivity without spilling a single drop of blood.

If firing a gun on the battlefield constitutes the masculine inscription of History, then wiping a woman’s face in the bathroom becomes the rewriting of herstory. Through this contrapuntal imagery, Thomas Keneally exposes the dual modalities of patriarchal violence: it is both the deafening roar of public conflict and the suffocating silence of domestic control.

4. Fragmented Identities: Female Mirrors and Colonial Complicity

Flo’s tragedy is not an isolated case. By extending our analytical lens to other female characters in the novel, as well as to more marginalized Indigenous communities, we can discern how female identity undergoes a complex process of fragmentation under the dual structures of patriarchy and colonialism.

4.1 Silent mirrors: Anna Weber’s vicarious trauma

In *The Corporal Hitler’s Pistol*, if Flo’s suffering stems from her husband’s betrayal and indifference, then Anna Weber—the wife of Bert Weber—embodies a more concealed form of female predicament: the “vicarious trauma” of being married to a war hero. Existing criticism tends to focus on Bert’s post-traumatic stress disorder, emphasizing his outbursts in the cinema and his fear of red light, while overlooking Anna, who clings tightly to his arm in the darkness, attempting to contain his unraveling.

Anna functions as a quintessential “present absence” within the narrative. While society imbues Bert’s madness with a certain tragic sublimity, what remains for Anna is pure humiliation and the endless burden of caregiving. When Bert screams in the Victoria cinema, public attention converges on the wounded veteran, eliciting sympathy; for Anna, however, the experience amounts to a form of “social death.” Her own needs are entirely suspended, and the meaning of her existence is reduced to sustaining the social fiction of Bert as a “normal” man. This form of concealed suffering, as scholars of symbolic violence such as Daniel Castañeda have suggested in mapping its contemporary manifestations, constitutes a paradigmatic case of “structural invisibility”—a form of pain that is systematically ignored due to the absence of a public discursive framework through

which it might be articulated.

4.2 The double standard of madness

By placing Flo’s situation alongside Anna’s, a gendered double standard of madness becomes apparent. In the novel, male irrationality is frequently interpreted as the consequence of historical trauma, thereby granting it a degree of exemption or even respect. For instance, when Bert screams in the cinema, others merely remark that he is ordinarily a decent man and not usually like this. By contrast, when Flo attempts to articulate her anger—or even simply to express a selfhood beyond that of a housewife through the act of applying makeup—such behavior is immediately classified by Burley and the lawyer as “hysteria” or “impropriety.”

This contrast exposes patriarchy’s monopoly over rationality. Men possess the privilege of madness: their loss of control is framed as part of history. Women, by contrast, are required to remain rational, stable, and sanitized “stabilizers” of the household. For a woman to attempt to challenge male law with her own reasoning is, in itself, construed as a form of “social madness.” Flo’s failure to secure legal support is thus partly attributable to her attempt to disrupt this entrenched order.

Here, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of complicity offers a crucial analytical lens: symbolic violence, he argues, is a form of violence exercised upon social agents with their own (unwitting) participation. Social actors are not merely passive recipients of domination; even when constrained by structural conditions, they contribute, through their practices, to the maintenance of these very structures. Crucially, however, this participation does not occur at the level of conscious awareness. Under the influence of habitus, individuals do not necessarily perceive domination as “violence”; rather, they come to accept it as natural and self-evident, thereby unconsciously reproducing it.

This theoretical logic is precisely mirrored in the novel’s characterization. Flo’s self-doubt following rejection by the lawyer and humiliation by her husband exemplifies this mechanism of complicity: she begins, at a subconscious level, to internalize society’s definitions of her, interpreting her resistance as indeed “hysterical” or “improper.” In contrast, Anna complies with this double standard, becoming an invisible caregiver, while Flo’s attempt at resistance ultimately collapses into self-negation. What emerges, then, is the most insidious consequence of institutional oppression: the subject’s unconscious recognition and internalization of

violence itself.

4.3 Intersectional predicament: white women as agents of colonial power

In examining Flo's tragedy, a purely unidimensional framework—such as “white men oppressing white women”—risks falling into the trap of essentialism. By introducing Kimberlé Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality, it becomes clear that Flo is situated at the intersection of multiple axes of power, including gender, class, and race. In her interactions with her husband Burley and the lawyer Carterford, she occupies a subordinate position as a victim within patriarchal and class hierarchies. Yet when confronting Indigenous women and the mixed-race illegitimate child Eddie, she assumes a position of racial and social privilege, becoming, in turn, an agent of domination (Crenshaw, 1989).

Flo's visit to the Indigenous camp is deeply ironic. Motivated by an almost Madonna-like impulse to “save,” she attempts to intervene in Eddie's life, planning to send him to a white school. Within her own moral framework, this appears as an act of benevolence—a form of atonement, as the legitimate wife, for her husband's transgressions. However, beneath this apparent goodwill lies a profound colonial arrogance. She never consults the child's biological mother or Indigenous kin; instead, she assumes, without question, that “becoming white” constitutes the best possible redemption for Eddie. In doing so, Flo unconsciously appropriates the very logic through which she herself is oppressed: just as Burley seeks to “correct” her by erasing the makeup from her face, she attempts to “save” Eddie by erasing the Indigenous cultural traces inscribed upon him.

4.4 The historical shadow of assimilation: the stolen generations

Flo's actions must be examined within the context of the harsh assimilation policies of 1930s Australia. At the time, governmental authorities maintained that the optimal “solution” for mixed-race Indigenous children was to remove them from their Aboriginal families and place them in white institutions for processes of “civilizing” transformation. This policy was implemented through the forcible removal of children and the severing of their ties to their families, ultimately giving rise to the notorious Stolen Generations (New South Wales Government, 1915). Crucially, such coercive assimilation was often cloaked in a rhetoric of benevolence. Within the dominant discourse of New South Wales at the time, Indigenous culture was

widely regarded as a “doomed” and backward civilization, while integrating lighter-skinned mixed-race children into white society was framed as granting them their only viable “future.” This ostensibly altruistic logic of “rescue,” however, concealed the violent rupture of Indigenous kinship bonds.

Flo fully internalizes this colonial discourse. Her concern for Eddie is not grounded in respect for the child as an individual subject, but rather in a pathological fixation on his partial “white” ancestry. At a subconscious level, she comes to believe that only by stripping away his Indigeneity can Eddie attain value as a “person.”

Her attempt to send Eddie to a white school thus constitutes a micro-level projection of state ideology onto individual practice. Within the marginal space of the Indigenous camp, Flo seeks to affirm her own fragile subjectivity by dispossessing an Indigenous mother of her child. This operates as a form of compensatory power: denied agency within the world of white men, she attempts to exercise authority within the Indigenous sphere. By assuming the role of a “civilizing agent,” she seeks to acquire a form of delegated privilege, thereby offsetting the humiliation and powerlessness she experiences within her marriage. This chain—whereby the victim becomes the perpetrator—reveals with particular clarity how colonialism corrodes the very foundations of human empathy. Ultimately, Flo occupies a condition of “placelessness”: she is protected neither by white law nor accepted within Indigenous moral frameworks, becoming a figure who is at once tragic and complicit within the brutal institutional order of her time.

5. Conclusion

In sum, *The Corporal Hitler's Pistol* employs the figure of Flo to illuminate the existential predicament of women in 1930s Australia within the dual domains of law and family. This predicament arises not merely from economic dependency, but more fundamentally from the exclusionary nature of legal discourse and the operation of symbolic violence. The judicial system, as embodied by the lawyer Carterford, constructs a barrier that excludes women's experiences through obscure terminology and stringent evidentiary requirements. This is not simply the wrongdoing of isolated individuals, but a form of seamless institutional complicity: the family conceals violence under the guise of privacy, the law denies relief in the name of procedural justice, and

society marginalizes dissenters through moral condemnation.

Flo's predicament is not confined to its specific historical moment; it also speaks to a central problem in the sociology of law—the disjunction between “formal justice” and “substantive justice.” Although Australian law in the 1930s nominally granted women certain property rights, as long as the underlying logic of legal operation—namely linguistic conventions, evidentiary norms, and gendered assumptions—remained monopolized by men, women could only ever exist as “present absentees” within the juridical field. Carterford's insistence on archaic terminology reflects less a fidelity to legal doctrine than a stubborn defense of an entrenched gender order. This serves as a critical reminder that genuine gender equality requires not only legislative reform, but also the dismantling of deeply embedded and often invisible discursive hegemonies.

Although this study does not explicitly adopt a feminist stance, Flo's experience demonstrates that when law becomes an instrument of cold institutional complicity, the harm extends beyond women to all individuals who seek to preserve their dignity under systemic constraint. The “misread dialogue” in the lawyer's office is not only an echo of a historical tragedy, but also a mirror reflecting the frailty and voicelessness of all those confronted with dominant power discourses. Such suppression of human life and subjectivity requires no ideological label to be recognized as profoundly unsettling.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that he has no conflicts of interest in this work.

Acknowledgement

The author received no financial support for this research.

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How to Cite: Dong, H. (2026). Misread “Dialogue”: Legal Violence and Female Silencing in The Corporal Hitler's Pistol – With Reference to Institutional Complicity under Australian Patriarchy in the 1930s. *Contemporary Education and Teaching Research*, 07(04), 126-132. <https://doi.org/10.61360/BoniCETR262019920404>